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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fall 2001 book of the South Carolina Law Review contains an essay
by Joan Tarpley, J.D., Professor of Law at the Walter F. George School of
Law, Mercer University entitled, A Comment on Justice O'Connor's Quest for
Power and Its Impact on African American Wealth.' The essay is an
overheated, sensational personal attack masquerading under the guise of legal
scholarship. Its thesis is that Justice O'Connor is a white supremacist who,
through her opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,2 seeks to
dismantle affirmative action jurisprudence and strengthen her position as the
swing vote on the United States Supreme Court in order to exercise the power
of Chief Justice, in fact, if not in name.
Selection to the editorial staff of the South Carolina Law Review in the
spring of my first year of law school remains one of the proudest events of my
*Chief Justice, Supreme Court of South Carolina.
1. Joan Tarpley, A Comment on Justice O'Connor's Quest for Power and Its Impact on
African American Wealth, 53 S.C. L. REv. 117 (2001).
2. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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legal career. For over 35 years, I have followed with pride and contributed to
the progress of our law journal. I was keenly disappointed to read such a racist
article in our Law Review, but if simple disagreement were the only
motivation, my own opinions would have remained completely private.
Respect for the Law Review's obligation to present a variety of opinions,
made me hesitate over this past year to publicly discuss this article. The First
Amendment is considered by many, including myself, to occupy the status of
primus interpares among the constitutional amendments which comprise the
Bill of Rights.' In our country, freedom to express the most unpopular point of
view is the handmaiden of liberty, the foundation of all the other protections
contained in the original constitutional framework. However, I have concluded
that Professor Tarpley's article does necessitate a response, not only to discuss
the merits of her analysis, but also to address what I consider to be the real evil
of her article: the implication her attack on Justice O'Connor, as a judge, has
for the independence of the judiciary of the United States.
At the outset, it may be rightly observed that members of the United States
Supreme Court, with a lifetime appointment, have very little to fear from even
the most savage and unwarranted criticisms. However, I would suggest that the
unchallenged use of ad hominem attacks as a vehicle for discussing the
opinions or rulings of a judge creates a climate of disrespect for the rule of law
which undermines the very foundation of freedom in America. Thus, I am
determined to use this Essay both to reply to Professor Tarpley and to discuss
judicial independence.
II. BACKGROUND
The founders of this nation recognized that judicial independence is
essential to the administration ofjustice and sought to establish ajudiciary free
from political and personal agendas. As noted in the Preamble to the Code of
Judicial Conduct,' "Our legal system is based on the principle that an
independent, fair and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JoHN ADAMS 103 (2001). In trying to convince his colleagues that
a Bill of Rights should be inserted into the Constitution, James Madison stated that "independent
tribunals ofjustice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights;
they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or
executive ..." Maeva Marcus, The Adoption of the Bill of Rights, I WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
115, 119 (1992) (quoting James Madison's speech to the House of Representatives (June 8,
1789)). Similarly, Alexander Hamilton displayed his belief in the independent judiciary when
he quoted Baron de Montesquieu: "'[T]here is no liberty, if the power of judging be not
separated from legislative and executive powers'.... The complete independence of the courts
of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 491
(Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
5. Rule 501, SCACR.
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govern us." Judges "must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust
and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system."6
Since the Court's early days, the press has subjected the Justices of the
United States Supreme Court to criticism. In the landmark decision Marbury
v. Madison7 the Supreme Court announced the doctrine of judicial review,
thereby avoiding a showdown between the executive and judiciary. Republican
newspapers denounced Federalist Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion as "a
political act unworthy of a court of law."8 In contrast, Federalist papers
heralded Marshall's opinion as a "stroke of genius, which saved the concept of
an independent judiciary from certain destruction." 9 Although the Court
ultimately held it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the question presented because
the statute conferring jurisdiction was unconstitutional, the Chief Justice first
made it clear that President Jefferson's actions in permitting Madison to
withhold delivery of the commissions authorized by President Adam's
administration were "not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal
right." ° Significantly, while Jefferson's party's newspapers openly criticized
Marshall's Court as politically motivated, President Jefferson himself kept his
disagreement with the Court's decision private. " President Jefferson's restraint
is particularly remarkable in light of the public perception of Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion "as an attack upon [Jefferson's] integrity and the policies
of his administration.'
' 2
A more recent and egregious judicial attack occurred in the wake of the
Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education decisions. 3 On the heels of
Brown and other controversial decisions, the John Birch Society initiated a
nationwide campaign to impeach Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice
William Douglas.' 4 The group mounted their campaign by scattering "Impeach
Earl Warren" billboards around the country and even sponsored a nation-wide
6. Id. at pmbl.
7. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). This case arose out of the attempt of President Jefferson's Secretary
of State, James Madison, to prevent delivery of commissions for the office of Justice of the
Peace for the District of Columbia. The commissions had been authorized by the preceding
Adams administration, but were never delivered. See Johnny C. Burris, Some Preliminary
Thoughts on a Contextual Historical Theory for the Legitimacy of Judicial Review, 12 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 585, 608-26 (1987), for an overview of the highly charged election of 1800 and
ensuing power struggle between the Federalist and Republican parties leading up to Justice
Marshall's opinion.
8. Burris, supra note 7, at 639.
9. Id. at 634-35 (footnote omitted).
10. Marbury, 5 U.S. 137 at 162; see also Paul E. McGreal, Ambition's Playground, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1107 (2000) (discussing Marbury v. Madison and its relationship to the
Constitutional doctrines of judicial review and checks and balances).
11. Burris, supra note 7, at 641-42.
12. Id. at 641 (citations omitted).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
14. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Judicial Activism or Judicial Necessity: The D.C. District
Court's Criminal Justice Legacy, 90 GEO. L.J. 685, 693 (2002).
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essay competition on the subject of why Earl Warren should be impeached."5
Two extremists, Fulton Lewis, Jr. and retired Marine Colonel Mitchell Paige,
spoke at forums around the country advocating that Chief Justice Warren be
hanged. 6
III. PROFESSOR TARPLEY'S ATTACK ON JUSTICE O'CONNOR
Professor Tarpley launched a similarly outrageous attack in her article, A
Comment on Justice 0 'Connor's Quest for Power and Its Impact on African
American Wealth.'7 Admittedly, Professor Tarpley was exercising her
constitutional right of free speech in criticizing the affirmative action decisions
of Justice O'Connor. Since the United States Supreme Court's rulings are not
subject to appellate review, it is essential that academic criticism be leveled
against its decisions. However, in her attempt to uncover an improper agenda
underlying Justice O'Connor's decisions in affirmative action cases, Professor
Tarpley resorts to a sensationalistic and very personal attack on Justice
O'Connor. Professor Tarpley's chosen form of criticism-attribution of
extrajudicial motives to Justice O'Connor-is devoid of arguments that might
further the cause of affirmative action and is also damaging to the overall
independence of our judiciary.
Although Professor Tarpley is free to disagree with Justice O'Connor's
affirmative action decisions, as did the members of the United States Supreme
Court who dissented in those cases, it is completely unwarranted to allege, with
no basis whatsoever, that Justice O'Connor is a "Machiavellian"' 8 power seeker
who will manipulate the law to achieve her goals. The Professor's article
bristles with footnotes and citations and yet her central thesis is pure fantasy,
unsupported by any evidence. Professor Tarpley's essay is replete with
unfounded statements, such as the allegation that Justice O'Connor's
appointment to the Court prevented "some well-deserving white male" from
being appointed "because of the discriminatory gender preference in favor of
[Justice] O'Connor."' 9 The inflammatory assertions that Justice O'Connor has
a "primal intent to preserve white status quo elitism each time she confronts an
affirmative action plan,"20 wishes to "protect white entitlement,"'" has "a
resolute fidelity to 'white supremacy,"' 22 and is "an elitist '23 lack any
foundation and verge on libel. Professor Tarpley's analogies of Justice
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Tarpley, supra note 1.
18. Id. at 139.
19. Id. at 119.
20. Id. at 120.
21. Id. at 122.
22. Id. at 120.
23. Tarpley, supra note 1, at 135.
[Vol. 54:267
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O'Connor's affirmative action decisions to "street gang warfare" 24 and "Bull
Connor's Alabama helmet police and savage dogs"25 are ironically reminiscent
of the reverse sensationalism employed by the John Birch Society against Chief
Justice Earl Warren in the 1950s.26 Such irresponsible characterizations are
normally confined to the realm of the pulp press and fortunately find no
foothold in academia. The use of such unjustified, inflammatory language by
a member of the Bar who is entrusted with the education of future attorneys is
particularly disturbing to me.
Interestingly, Professor Tarpley indicated in a 1999 law review article on
the Supreme Court's decisions on sexual harassment that Justices O'Connor
and Ginsberg were "holding down their branch of government well."27
Apparently, when Professor Tarpley agrees with Justice O'Connor's decisions,
she believes the Justice is an able jurist. However, when she disagrees, the
professor lashes out with vicious castigation.
Professor Tarpley offers no support for her attacks on Justice O'Connor's
application of the law in affirmative action cases. Instead, her essay is merely
a hostile attack on Justice O'Conn6r and the judiciary as a whole. Professor
Tarpley's assertion that Justice O'Connor portrays herself as moderate so that
other members of the Court will join in her opinions 21 implies that the other
members of the Court are unable to comprehend the true effect of Justice
O'Connor's opinions.
Although I may join Professor Tarpley in disagreement with Justice
O'Connor's affirmative action analysis on an academic level, I am still able to
recognize that Justice O'Connor's affirmative action opinions represent the
struggle of all members of the United States Supreme Court to develop a
coherent, effective, and constitutional approach to remedy past and to prevent
future discrimination based on race and gender. The complicated and
contradictory history of recent affirmative action decisions warrants at least a
sketch as background to my comments.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD FOR EQUAL
PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO RACE-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS
In City ofRichmond v. J.A. Croson Co.29 the Supreme Court reviewed the
City of Richmond's ("City") affirmative action plan for city construction
contracts. The City's plan required that prime contractors subcontract at least
thirty percent of the dollar amount of their contracts to minority business
24. Id. at 119.
25. Id.
26. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
27. Joan R. Tarpley, American Jurisprudence and Myth Viewed Through the Lens of the
Supreme Court and Sexual Harassment, 23 AM. J. TRiAL ADvOC. 291, 321 (1999).
28. Tarpley, supra note 1, at 140.
29. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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enterprises (MBE) owned or controlled by citizens who are "Blacks, Spanish-
speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts."3 The City provided for a
waiver of this thirty percent set-aside upon proof that sufficient minority
businesses were unavailable or unwilling to participate.31 J.A. Croson Co., the
sole bidder on a city contract to supply and install plumbing fixtures, attempted
without success to obtain a subcontract bid from a minority business.32 The one
MBE that expressed interest could not give J.A. Croson Co. a quote within the
time required for two reasons: (1) the supplier that the MBE contacted had
already quoted Croson directly and, therefore, would not quote the MBE, and
(2) the MBE had problems in obtaining the required credit approval.33 With no
feasible MBE subcontractor as a part of its bid, J.A. Croson Co. requested a
waiver. J.A. Croson Co.'s waiver request was denied, and it lost the contract. 34
Consequently, J.A. Croson Co. challenged the constitutionality of the City's
affirmative action plan on equal protection grounds.
35
The U.S. Supreme Court had previously approved a ten percent minority
set-aside on federal contracts in their 1980 decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick,a6
holding "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily
receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with
constitutional guarantees. '37 Relying on Fullilove U.S. District Judge Robert
Mehrige denied J.A. Croson Co.'s challenge and upheld the constitutionality
of the plan, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 8
While Croson's petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was
pending, the Court decided Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.39 At issue
in Wygant was a provision of the Jackson County, Michigan Board of
Education's collective bargaining agreement, which gave preferential
protection from layoffs to some employees because of race or national origin.40
Applying a strict scrutiny standard, the Court held the provision violated Equal
Protection. 41 The opinion of the Court begins by observing that governmental
classifications based on race have long been subject to the most searching
examination by the Court. Citing Fullilove the Court then enunciated the
constitutional standard as follows:
30. Id. at 478.
31. Id. at 478-79.
32. Id. at 482.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 483.
35. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 483 (1989).
36. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
37. Id. at491.
38. Croson, 488 U.S. at 483-84.
39. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
40. Id. at 269-70.
41. Id. at 283-84.
[Vol. 54: 267
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There are two prongs to this examination. First, any racial
classification "must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest." Second, the means chosen by the
State to effectuate its purpose must be "narrowly tailored to
the achievement of that goal." We must decide whether the
layoff provision is supported by a compelling state purpose
and whether the means chosen to accomplish that purpose are
narrowly tailored.42
Without deciding whether the School Board's plan was justified by a
compelling state interest, the Court found that the School Board's layoff plan
placed too large a burden on particular individuals and, therefore, was not
sufficiently narrowly tailored.43 The Court noted that other "less intrusive
means of accomplishing similar purposes" were available." The opinion of the
Court was authored by Justice Powell for a plurality including Chief Justice
Burger, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Rehnquist. Justice White concurred in
the judgment. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmon, and Stevens dissented.4"
The vigorous debate within the Supreme Court preceding Wygant about
how to remedy the effects of historic governmental discrimination had surfaced
in cases brought by the victims of historic discrimination as well as in
challenges to legislative preferences in favor of minorities. As the case law
preceding Croson demonstrates, the Supreme Court had been struggling with
the question of whether any distinction in the law based on race, ethnicity, or
gender," even when based on benign motives, could survive the scrutiny of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.47 In 1978, some ten
years before the Croson decision and three years before Justice O'Connor's
Supreme Court appointment, the Court upheld a white student's challenge to
University of California's minority preference medical school policy in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke' by applying a strict scrutiny standard.
The entire Court concurred in the judgment; Justices Powell, Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun agreed that racial classifications called for strict
scrutiny.4 Therefore, the debate over race-based classifications and the Court's
42. Id. at 274 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 278, 283.
44. Id. at 283-84.
45. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1986).
46. For an illustration of the Court's struggle to scrutinize gender-based classifications, see
Miss. Univ.for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), in which Justice O'Connor, writing for
the Court, applied an intermediate scrutiny standard.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
48. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
49. Id. at 305-06.
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eventual move toward a strict scrutiny standard well preceded Justice
O'Connor's addition to the Court."0
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wygant, in which a plurality of
the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard in the affirmative action context, the
Court remanded Croson to the Fourth Circuit for further consideration.5 , On
remand, using the two-prong strict scrutiny test from Wygant, the Fourth
Circuit held that the City of Richmond's plan was unconstitutional because (1)
the City had not shown a compelling state interest, in that the record did not
contain any evidence of prior discrimination by the City in awarding
construction contracts 52 and (2) the thirty percent set-aside was not narrowly
tailored to remediate the discrimination.53 The table was set for the Supreme
Court to address the question of whether to adopt a strict scrutiny test for all
affirmative action cases. When the Croson case came back up before the
Supreme Court, the Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit.5 ' The test enunciated by
Justice O'Connor in the Croson opinion was not groundbreaking; it was the
same as that used in Wygant and has its roots in the racial classification cases
decided by the Court prior to Wygant.
Instead, what divided the Court in Croson the most was the evidence
question. The City failed to offer detailed evidence of past discrimination in
awarding construction contracts. Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice White, and Justice Kennedy considered this lack of specific evidence
fatal to the claim that a compelling state interest existed.55 Justice Scalia,
concurring in the judgment, would not uphold any governmental racial
classifications adopted to remedy past discrimination.56 Justices Marshall,
Blackmon, and Brennan dissented, contending that the City of Richmond need
not show specific evidence of past racial discrimination in awarding
construction contracts, but rather could justify its plan as a remedy for the
City's overall history of racial discrimination. 57 Justice Stevens concurred in the
judgment of the plurality that the City had not justified its ordinance as a
remedy for past discrimination; however, he would approve governmental




50. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273-74, for Justice Powell's discussion of the evolution of the
strict scrutiny standard.
51. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 485 (1989).
52. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1357-59 (4th Cir. 1987).
53. Id. at 1360-61.
54. Croson, 488 U.S. at 511.
55. Id. at 498-506.
56. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 528-29 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 514 (Stevens, J., concurring).
[Vol. 54: 267
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V. POST-CROSON: METRO BROADCASTING AND ADARAND
The very next year, the Supreme Court seemed to withdraw from the strict
scrutiny test enunciated in Croson in the opinion Justice Brennan wrote for the
Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC. 9 In Metro Broadcasting the Croson
dissenters formed the majority, joined by Justice Stevens, and upheld the
Federal Communications Commission's minority preference policies which
allowed a limited category of existing radio and television licenses to be
transferred only to minority controlled firms."0 Metro Broadcasting contended
that this policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The majority in this case rejected the use of a strict scrutiny test
when reviewing congressionally mandated, benign racial classifications,6
1
holding that "the FCC minority ownership policies pass muster under the test
we announce today. First, we find that they serve the important governmental
objective of broadcast diversity. Second, we conclude that they are
substantially related to the achievement of that objective., 6
2 Rather than
overruling Croson, Justice Brennan distinguished the Croson case on the
ground that it involved a local government ordinance which should be subject
to a higher level of scrutiny than an act of congress. Justice Brennan wrote for
the Court: "race-conscious classifications adopted by Congress to address racial
and ethnic discrimination are subject to a different standard than such
classifications prescribed by state and local governments.
63 Justice Stevens
joined in the opinion and judgment, but observed, "Today the Court squarely
rejects the proposition that a governmental decision that rests on a racial
classification is never permissible except as a remedy for a past wrong. I
endorse this focus on the future benefit, rather than the remedial justification,
of such decisions." 6
Predictably, the Croson plurality of Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia,
and Kennedy vigorously dissented in Metro Broadcasting. Justice O'Connor
wrote, "The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection binds the Federal
Government as it does the States, and no lower level of scrutiny applies to the
Federal Government's use of race classifications. 65 She was particularly
troubled by the majority's use of the designation "benign racial classification"
and pointed out that the right to equal protection of the laws is a personal
right.66 Justice O'Connor opined that the majority's use of the term "benign
racial classification" depends entirely on its "ability to distinguish good from
59. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
60. Id. at 552.
61. Id. at 564-65.
62. Id. at 566.
63. Id. at 565.
64. Id. at 601 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing his concurring opinion in Croson, 488 U.S.
at 511-13).
65. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 609 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
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harmful governmental" use of race-based classifications. "History," she noted,
"should teach greater humility., 67 Justice O'Connor argued that by using the
less rigorous standard of "substantially related to an important governmental
objective," the majority was leaving the door open to upholding racial
distinctions based on the "preference of the moment."6
Echoing Justice O'Connor's fears, Justice Kennedy, in dissent, expressed
the fear that the test enunciated in Metro Broadcasting would revive the
"relaxed" standard used by the Court to uphold Louisiana's mandatory
segregation laws.69 Citing to the Court's now widely discredited decisions
upholding the internment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II,
Justice Kennedy said:
I cannot agree with the Court that the Constitution
permits the Government to discriminate among its citizens on
the basis of race in order to serve interests so trivial as
"broadcast diversity." In abandoning strict scrutiny to endorse
this interest the Court turns back the clock on the level of
scrutiny applicable to federal race-conscious measures. Even
strict scrutiny may not have sufficed to invalidate early race-
based laws of most doubtful validity, as we learned in
Korematsu v. United States. But the relaxed standard of
review embraced today would validate that case, and any
number of future racial classifications the Government may
find useful. Strict scrutiny is the surest test the Court has yet
devised for holding true to the constitutional command of
racial equality.70
Thus, the Court was still deeply divided following Croson regarding its equal
protection analysis in the affirmative action context.
Five years later, the Court was again faced with a congressionally adopted
racial classification in an affirmative action setting. Under review in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena7 were regulations of the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) developed to implement congressional adoption of a
minimum ten percent government contract set-aside for "socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals. 7 2 The DOT presumed that certain
racial groups73 met this test and gave DOT contractors financial incentives to
67. Id. at 609.
68. Id. at 610.
69. Id. at 631-32 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896)).
70. Id. at 633-34 (citation omitted).
71. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
72. Id. at 205.
73. The "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" included "Black Americans,
Hispanic Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities." Id.
[Vol. 54: 267
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 2 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol54/iss2/3
REPLY TO PROFESSOR TARPLEY
hire subcontractors controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals. Justice O'Connor wrote for a majority consisting of herself, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. Through her
opinion, the Court returned to the strict scrutiny standard and the two-pronged
test of Croson in the equal protection analysis of any federal, state, or local
government racial classification, whether or not such classification was
remedial or benign.74 To the extent Fullilove or Metro Broadcasting adopted
a more relaxed test for analyzing congressional enactments or federal agency
regulations and practices, the cases were overruled by Adarand. Also rejected
was the notion that a different level of analysis of equal protection is permitted
under the Fifth Amendment than that employed under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Vigorous dissents were filed by Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsberg, and Breyer.76
Even though she would employ a deferential test when analyzing
Congressional enactments aimed at remedying past racial discrimination,
Justice Ginsberg, in dissent, acknowledged the sincere motivations of the
majority. She observed:
The divisions in this difficult case should not obscure the
Court's recognition of the persistence of racial inequality and
a majority's acknowledgment of Congress' authority to act
affirmatively, not only to end discrimination, but also to
counteract discrimination's lingering effects.
While I would not disturb the programs challenged in this
case, and would leave their improvement to the political
branches, I see today's decision as one that allows our
precedent to evolve, still to be informed by and responsive to
changing conditions.77
Justice Ginsberg's depiction of the Court's continuing struggle to develop a
cohesive approach for equal protection challenges to race-based classifications
stands in direct contradiction to Professor Tarpley's wild assertions regarding
Justice O'Connor's extrajudicial motivations.
Professor Tarpley does not really take issue with Justice O'Connor's
enunciation of the two- prong strict scrutiny test, nor does she contend that the
City of Richmond offered specific evidence of the past discrimination to justify
adopting the ordinance. Rather, Professor Tarpley contends that, in the specific
facts of the Croson bid, J.A. Croson Co. discriminated against a potential
minority business supplier, and that this was evidence of systematic exclusion
74. Id. at 227, 235-36.
75. Id. at 227.
76. Id. at 242, 265.
77. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 273, 276 (1995).
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of minority suppliers. 7' Neither the City nor the dissent by Justice Marshall
makes this claim.
In her opinion in Croson, Justice O'Connor did note that a potential
supplier refused to quote a price to an African-American subcontractor. Justice
O'Connor cited the fact that the supplier had already given a direct quote to the
prime contractor, J.A. Croson Co., as the reason for the supplier's refusal to
quote to the African-American subcontractor. 79 According to Professor Tarpley,
Justice O'Connor refused to recognize the discrimination in the case, insisting
the refusal of the white supplier to give the quote to an African-American was"surely""0 race-related. Unfortunately, the Professor failed to support this
assertion with any facts other than the race of the business owners. Although
I may have joined Professor Tarpley in a well-reasoned critique of Justice
O'Connor's holding on the merits of Croson, Professor Tarpley's overly
conclusive assertions leave no room for that possibility, as they are utterly
devoid of any meaningful support.81
Professor Tarpley further states that Justice O'Connor abandons judicial
precedent to reach the results she seeks. 2 Although, as discussed, Adarand did
overrule the decision in Metro Broadcasting, Justice O'Connor contended that
Metro Broadcasting was a departure from a strict scrutiny doctrine established
over a fifty-year period. 3 By overruling Metro Broadcasting, Justice O'Connor
reasoned that the Court was actually restoring "the fabric of the law" instead
of refusing to follow precedent.84
In the years following Adarand, two-pronged strict scrutiny has become
the accepted standard for an equal protection analysis of a governmentally
adopted affirmative action plan. 5 But there is still great debate as to the type
of evidence required to demonstrate both the compelling state interest and the
narrow tailoring prongs of strict scrutiny.86 The Fifth Circuit has, in effect, rule
78. Tarpley, supra note 1, at 124.
79. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 482 (1989).
80. Tarpley, supra note 1, at 124.
81. Like Justice Marshall, I would have allowed the evidence of Richmond's past history
of governmentally enforced segregation to suffice as evidence of past discrimination. Thus, I
would have found the first prong of the Wygant-Croson strict scrutiny test to be met.
82. Id. at 118.
83. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231 (1995).
84. Id. at 233-34.
85. M.R. Killenbeck, Pushing Things Up to Their First Principles: Reflections on the
Values ofAffirmative Action, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1299,1313-16 (Dec. 1999) (analyzing competing
views among the federal circuits and the members of the Supreme Court itself post-Adarand
regarding the application of the strict scrutiny test in school admissions cases).
86. Smith v. University of Washington Law School, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that until the Supreme Court rules otherwise, a university can operate a race-conscious
admissions process because promoting future diversity is a compelling state interest); Hopwood
v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that neither a state university law school's interest
in achieving a diverse student body nor remediation of a state's general historical discrimination
are compelling state interests).
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that race can never be a factor in achieving a benign governmental objective. 7
To the contrary, the Ninth Cirucuit has held that promotion of future diversity
is a legitimate compelling state interest."s
Justice O'Connor and her fellow Justices on the Supreme Court will
attempt to resolve this question when they hear Grutter v. Bollinger9 this term.
In Grutter a Michigan U.S. District Court, reviewing the University of
Michigan's use of race and ethnicity in its admissions policy, found that
achieving a diverse student body was not a compelling state interest. The
district court believed that the Supreme Court had limited the use of racial and
ethnic considerations to remedying past discrimination.90 The Sixth Circuit
disagreed and reversed, finding that non-remedial consideration of race and
ethnicity to promote a diverse student body can be a compelling state interest.91
VI. THE IMPACT OF PERSONAL ATTACKS ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
I am certain that numerous commentators might disagree with Justice
O'Connor's decisions in affirmative action cases. Fortunately, in the spirit of
the robust debate that is so critical to our democratic system, some individuals
have produced informed, reasoned criticism of the decisions without resorting
to unfounded, vitriolic personal attacks on the author of the decision. In the
words of past ABA President, Jerome Shestack:
To be sure, reasoned criticism of judicial decisions is
perfectly acceptable. But misleading demagoguery, threats
and political intimidation distort the public's view of the
judicial process, and undermine public confidence in the
justice system, and have a chilling effect onjudges. The result
is an undermining of our independent judiciary.92
Professor Tarpley's attempt to convince others of the merits of affirmative
action through blatant falsities, such as the allegation that Justice O'Connor is
87. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944-48.
88. Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200-01; see alsoKenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, The
Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARv. C.R. -C.L. L. REV. 7 (1979) (stating
that Powell's opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, created a
benchmark for how professional schools can constitutionally factor an applicant's race into the
admissions process).
89. 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, _ S. Ct. __ , 2002 WL 1968753, 71
USLW 3154 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2002) (No. 02-241).
90. 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
91. Ironically, in several heated concurring and dissenting opinions, members of the Sixth
Circuit accuse their colleagues of forwarding personal, extrajudicial motives to affect their
decisions in Grutter, 288 F.3d 732 (In dissent, Judge Boggs personally attacks his colleagues,
attributing less than proper motives to their decision to hear the case en banc. In her concurring
opinion, Judge Moore admonishes Judge Boggs for this attack.).
92. Jerome J. Shestack, The Risks to Judicial Independence, A.B.A. J., June 1998, at 8, 8.
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a racist striving to keep African-Americans in economic bondage, all in her
effort to become Chief Justice,93 fails to further the cause of affirmative action,
and more significantly, erodes the ability of all judges to accomplish their
constitutional mandate to "interpret and apply the laws that govern us."'94
Judges, particularly those who are elected, are vulnerable to politically
motivated attack, which drastically constricts their ability to remain
independent. Those who disagree with ajudge's decision can easily distort that
judge's record in an attempt to oust the popularly elected judge from office. A
successful campaign to remove Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White
occurred in the wake of the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision to reverse and
remand the sentencing phase of a death penalty case." In this case the
Tennessee court held that the trial court committed reversible errors by refusing
to allow the defendant's clinical psychologist to testify at the penalty phase and
by refusing to instruct the jury on the mitigating circumstances raised by the
evidence in the sentencing phase, as required by Tennessee statute.96 Justice
White did not author the majority or a concurring opinion, but was nonetheless
singled out of the five justices who signed the opinion for a pointed attack
simply because she was up for re-election.97
A pro-death penalty faction used the decision as fodder to remove Justice
White from the bench. A political party mailed out anti-Penny White brochures
that stated, "Just Say NO! Vote for Capital Punishment by Voting NO on
August 1 for Supreme Court Justice Penny White." 98 Disregarding the reality
that the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision was practically mandated by
statute,99 the opinion was used as a platform to label Justice White as a pro-
criminal jurist.100 Consequently, Justice White was soundly defeated and
removed from the bench.
In states where judges are popularly elected, a judge's attempt to remain
independent from the partisan, issue-specific world may be easily thwarted by
anyone capable of twisting judicial opinions to be utilized for political capital.
The rhetorical question posed by Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist shortly
after Justice White was removed from the bench illustrates this point well:
"Should ajudge look over his shoulder [when making decisions] about whether
they're [sic] going to be thrown out of office? I hope so."10 1
93. Tarpley, supra note 1, at 118, 119, 120, 122, 135, 145.
94. Rule 501, SCACR.
95. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 33, 36 (Tenn. 1996).
96. Id. at 28, 30; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(e)(1) (1989); Stephen B. Bright, Political
Attacks on the Judiciary, 80 JUDICATURE 165, 169 (1997).
97. Bright, supra note 96, at 169.
98. Id. at 168-69.
99. § 39-13-204(e)(1).
100. Bright, supra note 96, at 169.
101. Paula Wade, White's Defeat Poses Legal Dilemma: How is a Replacement Justice
Picked?, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Aug. 3. 1996, at Al.
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Well I, for one, hope not. While we, as judges, should be criticized by
those who in good faith disagree with our rulings, we should not be attacked
by political pundits and issue mongers who try to benefit themselves personally
at our expense. Those who launch personal attacks against judges for their
professional decisions would be wise to follow President Jefferson's model of
political restraint.
0 2
Fortunately, our system of selecting judges in South Carolina insulates us,
as judges, just enough to enable us to maintain our judicial independence. One
of the most awesome of the South Carolina General Assembly's institutional
responsibilities is its duty to select judges. Tennessee and nineteen other states
select judges by popular election; twenty-six of the fifty states select judges by
appointment of the Governor.1 0 3 Three states use some form of legislative
election in combination with gubernatorial interim appointment."
4 South
Carolina, since colonial times, has followed the ruggedly independent course
of election of judges solely by its General Assembly.'
05
South Carolina's legislative selection system is rooted in a healthy distrust
of putting too much authority in the executive and in a strong desire to assure
judicial independence by protecting the selection process from the temporary
passions of popular election. Judicial independence is the cornerstone of any
system of judgment or dispute resolution. Independence is the handmaiden of
fairness and consistency, the hallmarks of a successful judicial system. The
perceived absence ofjudicial independence wrought by the royal appointment
system was, from early colonial times, one of the catalysts for the creation of
our system of legislative election.'0 6
South Carolina's constitutional design has proved a wise one--even more
so in this age of instant sound-bite politics and staggeringly costly election
campaigns. Our governmental structure encourages us as judges to faithfully
uphold the laws of this state without having to constantly look over our
shoulders to see which interest group is using the sound-bite to try to remove
us from office.
In expressing my belief that judges should be able to decide cases free
from the personal whims of self-interested partisans, I am not suggesting that
judges should not be accountable for their actions. I fervently agree with Penny
White's distinction between independence and accountability:
The common denominator in all accurate descriptions of
judicial independence is that judicial independence does not
serve to remove ajudge from accountability. Rather, it serves
to remove a judge from accountability to the wrong sources.
102. Bums, supra note 7, at 652-53.
103. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, 33 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 137-39 (2000).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 1 JAMES LOWELL UNDERWOOD, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 7-22 (1986).
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Judicial independence is not the freedom of a judge to
decide cases based on personal whim or caprice, nor is it the
freedom of a judge to decide cases based on personal
viewpoints of what the law ought to require. A judge remains
accountable to the fair application of the law regardless of the
judge's endorsement of or belief in the law."0 7
Judges must remain accountable to the laws that govern their jurisdictions, but
their good faith efforts to uphold the law must not be held captive to the
demagogic whims of the John Birch Society, partisan political distortions, and
outlandish attacks of the Joan Tarpleys of the world."'8 I am hopeful that we
can discourage this type of self-serving criticism, at the very least among those
in our profession, in favor of the robust, academic, and critical debate that will
both reinforce the independence of our judiciary and contribute to the constant
dialogue necessary to a healthy democracy.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court's struggle to enunciate a strict scrutiny
test for analyzing the equal protection issues presented by governmental
affirmative action plans reflects the tension in American society between the
moral and constitutional imperative of a color-blind approach to the law and the
necessity of remediating our shameful past of legally enforced slavery and
segregation. Neither Croson nor Adarand constitutes an aberrant manipulation
of constitutional doctrine for base personal motives as Professor Tarpley
suggests. Rather, these cases represent and reflect America's continuing
struggle to create a just society.
As a state Chief Justice, I am deeply concerned about the vulnerability of
state court judges to personal attack. Over ninety-seven percent of cases in the
United States are filed in state courts. 09 In recent years, we have witnessed
with increasing frequency the use of violent, deeply personal attacks to voice
disagreement with a judge's ruling. The First Amendment, which permits such
attacks, is rarely any protection for the judge whose rulings become the
107. Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of Judicial
Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1060 (2002) (emphasis added).
108. The increasing frequency of attacks on judicial independence have prompted legal
organizations, including the American Bar Association, the American Trial Lawyers Association,
and the South Carolina Bar, and several states to appoint committees to address threats toj udicial
independence and to educate the public on the importance of an independent judiciary.
109. EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2001: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE
COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 10 (Brian J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2001).
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platform for a public campaign by a particular interest group, since the canons
of ethics often prohibit a judge from publicly defending her decision.'
10
This nation's courts are regularly called upon to resolve intensely divisive
constitutional issues. Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
concerning controversial issues such as affirmative action, abortion, the death
penalty, and regulatory takings excite heated public discussion. Robust debate
on such issues strengthens the constitutional underpinning of our system of
justice by forcing us to re-examine our society's aspirations and values using
the Constitution as our guide. The right to criticize judicial decisions is
indispensable in our democratic system of government. However, I would
suggest that it is unwarranted and inappropriate to use personal attacks on
judges to express disagreement with our decisions. Professor Tarpley's deeply
personal criticism does nothing more than erode public confidence in the
judicial system. I believe that as members of the legal profession, Professor
Tarpley and I have a special duty to temper even the fiercest criticism with
respect for the courts as an institution.
Finally, I disagree in the most fundamental way with the conclusions
Professor Tarpley has drawn about Justice O'Connor's personal values from
the Professor's utterly inaccurate reading of Justice O'Connor's written
opinions. These opinions, when fairly examined, reveal a thoughtful and
compassionate judge. But perhaps a writing even more revealing of the
Justice's character is the memoir Sandra Day O'Connor and her brother Alan
Day wrote about growing up on a cattle ranch in the American Southwest. The
spare yet evocative prose of Lazy B"'. sketches the life of the intensely loyal
Day family for whom straight dealing, hard work, and personal honesty were
core values. The Sandra Day O'Connor of this writing is shaped by the love
and high expectations of a mother and father who raised their daughter to prize
a job well done and the dignity of all people. In my view, a hidden personal
agenda is totally foreign to the decent and self-reliant woman who authored the
opinions Professor Tarpley attacks.
110. See, e.g., Canon 3(B)(9), Rule 501, SCACR ("A judge shall not, while a proceeding
is pending or impending in any court, make any public comment that might reasonably be
expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might
substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing.").
11l. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR & H. ALAN DAY, LAZY B (2002).
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